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PREFACE
The original title of this paper was intended to be,
"M6.HA.GEME1IT COHTEOL AT BUi<21iiU LEVMi", a comparison of the various
methods of financial control used by the principal material Bur-
eaus of the HaTy. The purpose was simply to gain familiarity with
the procedures in use in budgeting for and obtaining funds for th«
many and various programs. This basic knowledge could be of valu^
to a candidate for a comptroller's Job*
However, after a brief amount of reading, it was apparent
that each Bureau's instructions were basically the same, although
the format differed* At that point, I decided that a sample of
the Bureau of Ship's control over its field activities would suf-
fice, with an inspection of the general trend in implementing
TITLE IV. Fortunately, under the Facilities Branch of the Bureau
of Ships, activities operate under both the Havy Industrial Fund«
and the Appropriation System of Accounting, which comprise the two
basic structures for financial control in the Havy.
At this point I want to express my appreciation to Com-
mander J.C. McCarthy of the Havy Facilities Branch, Mr. R.]>.
Simmans, Assistant Comptroller for Budget, Bureau of Ships, Mr. B*
3). Broeksmith, Field Accounting Branch, Navy Comptroller's Office,
Captain E.X:. McKay, Comptroller, Sew York Naval Shipyard and J.
Grossman, Assistant Comptroller, Hew York Naval Shipyard who gen-






Comptrollarship . — Sino© the introduction of the oomptrollership
conoept in the Department of Defense in August 1949, the word
"Comptrollarship" and all that it implies has had many meanings
and reactions to different people* One commanding officer of a
defense industrial activity in 1954 remarked to some memhers of
the Cooper Committee, "Ho comptroller is going to control me."
To him the idea suggested that his prerogatives as commanding of-
ficer were in jeopardy of being usurped by some one whose functictt
he did not understand. This distorted view could well have been
supported by an equally inappropriate remark. In a talk before
the current fiavy Graduate Comptrollership Class one of the civil
ian speakers from the Bureau of Ordnance, in a side remark said,
"This is the greatest Job-grab in years".
Although both statements have a remote element of truth,
they are far from the original intentions expressed in the Title
IT section of Public Law 216. However, they are typical of the
suspicious fears of some, and the empire building aspirations of
the others throughout the management sphere of the Navy. For
this reason it would be well to examine the conditions that
centered the attention of Congress, special commissions and the
Secretary of Defense on the necessity for streamlining the busi-
ness management of the military establishment in the period fol-
lowing Vo'orld War II.

Baokgroand 1945-1949 .— Unlike similar post-war periods of the
past when the armed forces became an insignificant fraction of
their size in wartime, the uneasy and continuing status of the
"Cold-Wax" made in necessary to maintain an Army, Havy and Air-
Foroe of unheard of proportions. With this predominating thought
in mind, and with a view toward the effective utilisation of our
decreasing resources, the ol)Jective of promoting economy and ef-
ficiency in our national military establishment became paramount.
A Yast amount of evidence was collected by the military
services, special commissions and Congress which focussed atten-
tion on hundreds, if not thousands, of instances of poor manage-
ment and ineffective control, fienerally these were "after the
fact" revelations, and while responsible officials were required
to explain, overall performances did not improve to a marked de-
gree. For example, in 1945 while the Havy was investigating the
tremendous problem of cataloguing millions of separate electronic
spare parts, spare parts manufactured in 1926 were found in
1
storage at the Mare Island Havy Yard. If instances as this were
typical, and they were, programs for the future had to insure thai
we were not buying spares we already possessed. This pointed to a
basic and vital element necessary for improved management, an ac-
curate and properly controlled inventory program. This problem
1. Testimony of Mr. W. J. McNeil, Special Assistant to
the Secretary of Defense, Hearings Before Sub-Committee of the
Committee on Appropriations United States Senate, 80th Congress.
First Session p. 17. » "& t
}ij
of inventory control was, and at ill is, one of vast magnitude both
in relation to operating performance and dollar investment.
Similarly in another important area, that of proper util-
isation of funds, poor planning and poor performance were fre-
q,uently highlighted at appropriation hearings, ;^enator L. P*
Saltonetall of the Jiiightieth Congress cited these few cases:
(1) Project Order Humber 1-47-Researoh Havy for
125,000, issued July 1, 1946 for development of special
devices, had ;9>124,685 expended against it as of
December 21, 1V47.
{Z) Investigation revealed that it was common practice
to develop the great bulk of project orders in May and
June of each fiscal year in order to avoid losing money
that had been appropriated* A few glaring errors of this
widespread practice in the Havy Budget were:
(a) Marine Corps committed 82^ of project
orders in June 1947;
(b) Bureau of Medicine and Surgery committed
71»S^ of its project orders in June 1947;
(c) Research Havy, committed 32^ of its
project orders in June 1947;
(d) Bureau of Yards and Docks committed
25^ of its project orders in June 1947.^
She specific subject of project orders will be discussed
later in this paper* For the present, it is sufficient to note
that while progress has been made in more properly utilizing pro-
ject orders. Congress is not the least bit satisfied, and still
very suspicious of the intent behind a large percentage of those
issued.
In the meantime, while evidence of this nature was being
2. Hearings before the 3ub-Committee of the Committee




eolleoted, a continuing study was made under the sponsorship of
i>eoretary Forrestal, with the objective of impro-ving the business
mcmagement of the Havy. This role is briefly described by Mosher:
A principal stimulator in this mo-vement, as it may
properly be called, was the military establishment and
its sub-departments, particularly the Departments of
the Havy and Air Force* The Department of Defense as
a whole still occupies a place among the leaders in the
deTelopment of the new approach. The Havy in 1946 had
presented its fiscal year 1948 budget in two alternate
forms, one representing the traditional basis of Navy
appropriations, the other on a program basis* After
some argument with the Bureau of the Budget, both forms
were submitted to Congress* However, the appropriation
committees of the newly elected eightieth Congress chose
to ignore the new-style proposal* {Subsequently, the
idea of reorganising appropriation structures along
more rational lines was pushed from the level of the
newly formed Department of Defense, notably by beoretary
Forrestal ana W* jr. McJSeil, his special assistant. This
group, pressing its view on certain key Congressmen and
Senators, and later upon Mr* Hoover himself, contributed
to the emphatic vie^vs of the Hoover Commission on a re-
vised budgeting system*
As described in Chapter II, the Congress in 1949
made the performance budget mandatory for the entire
Department of Defense. Already, however, the newly
created Department of the Air Foree, under the necessity
and with the opportunity of building a new budget system
for itself, had set up a program or performance type
budget. The Navy followed in its budget for fiscal
year 1951. At the beginning of fiscal year 19&2, the
Army revised its appropriations to complete the change-
over in appropriations structure of the military depart-
ment 8 •
In spite of the apparent simplicity of the conce|^t
and in spite of the modifications in budgetary classi-
fications and appropriations, there is still much
question as to whether these departments in fact have
performance budgets. There is even some question whether
what they have done is in the direction of performance
budgets. As will be shown, the present budget structures
and systems of the Army, Havy, and Air Force differ markedly
from each other* Obviously, the term means different things
to different people*
3* Frederick C* Mosher, Program Budgeting ; Theory and
Practice, (New York: American Book - St rat ford Press, 19 54), p. 80
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A key figure in this campaign was Mr* Ferdinand Eterstadt,
long time friend and lousiness associate of Secretary of ])efense
i'orrestal. Besides having a distinguished career in both the law
and business fields, Mr* Eberstadt had been a leading consultant
on goYernmental problems since 1929. He had beenOvjenD. Young's
assistant at the 1929 Reparations Conference, during the war he
was Chairman of both the ^rmy and Mayy Munitions Board and the War
Froduotion Board. Later he presented the ii^berstadt Report for the
Secretary of the Havy in 1945, which gave the Navy*s views in the
losing fight against the national oeourity Act of 1947. Finally
he was to be Chairman of the Katlonal Security Organization Task
Force of the Hoover Commission*
The evidence presented iiJr. Eberstadt's Committee by
Secretary Forrestal, Mr. McNeil, other Secretaries of the Defense
Sstablishmant, and one hundred sixty other prominent witnesses,
clearly indicated the need for improving management in the Depart-
ment of Defense. Typical of the evidence presented was related to
the various sources of appropriations at the Bethesda Haval Medi-
cal Center. Appropriations came from at least twelve different
sources. To determine the cost of operating the hospital, it
would have been necessary to go through a maze of intricate and
Involved accounting. At no one point in the ISfavy Department could
one find in a single entry what it cost to run this operation,
particularly in time to be of value to top management. Facts such
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ae the^e, finally received the attention they merited, primarily
beoause of prestige of Hoc, Hoover.
Shortly thereafter, at ^Senator Byrd's request, Mr, Eber-
4
Btadt drafted the report which ultimately contained title IV.
In January 1949, when it was presented to Congress, for this pur-
pose of this paper, it was divided into two parts. The first
section dealt with reorganising the Department of Defense in
order to strengthen the powers of the Secretary of Defense. The
second part dealt with provisions for improving economy and effi-
ciency by reorganizing budgetary and fiscal procedures. Bue to
the intense controversies centering about the powers of the
Secretary of Defense, and the related programs of the seventy
group Air-Force, and scrapping the navy's superoarrier. Title IV
provisions for fiscal and budgetary reforms received relatively
4
little Congressional attention. In effect, the Congressional
Committees listened and unanimously agreed with the recommendations
presented.
Public Law 216 . — On August 10, 1949 the long sought goal of Mr.
Hoover, Mr. Forrestal, Mr. Kberatadt, and Mr. McNeil was finally
realised when the National Security Act Amendments of 1949, Public
Law 216 - Slst Congress were approved. The main provisions of
4. U.S. 8grd Congress First Session Hearings before pre-
paredness ComiTiittee No. S of the Couimittee on Armed Services
United States Senate, IMPLEMENT^.T ION OF TI'fLS IV NiiTIONAL SKCUKITT
ACT OF 1947, AS iJtiENDED, Nov. 2, 1953.
gu w*.
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TITLE IV section, as summarized by Senator Tydings were:
The title contains various provisions, all of
vhich are intended to impleirifnt the authority 0T'"€;r
the budgets of the military services conferred upon
the Secretary of Defense under Section 202 (a) of
the National Security Act. The title provides,
among other thinrs, for the appointment of & Comp-
troller in the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
for the appointment of CoEiptroller in the military
departments e.nd for comparable organize tion and
procedures in budgetary and fiscal Triatters in the
office of the Secretary of Defense and in the Mili-
tary Departments.
The title also provides for the presentation of
budgets in s form that clearly reflects the costs
of performing the activities of the Department of
Defense and for the conduct of authorized pro^'irams
in the same manner. It contains authority for cer-
tain program adjustments, and rives the Secretary
of Defense control over requests for legislation
which would authorize new appropriations. It also
contains provisions designed to prevent overdrafts
and deficiencies. Among its other provisions are
authority for the organization of inventories of
the military departments into stock funds, for the
operation of industrial and cominerci:'! type f-cti-
vities as integral working units on the basis of
adequate capital structure, for industrial manage-
ment f-unds to facilitate the carrying out of joint
and special operations, for uniform terminologies,
classifications, reportinr; systems and accounting
procedures, and for reports of property.
Whatever may have been the differences of view
on other matters expressed by those who testified
before the Armed Services Committee of the Sen:ite,
there seems to have been unanimous agreement that
the Secretary of Defr-nse should hsve effective
authority and control over military budgets and
over fiscal procedures. This authority is conferred
upon the Secretary of Defense by the provisions of
Section 202(a). The new TITLH IV is intended to
implem.ent it. Its provisions are designed to place
the operation of the Defense Establishment on a
sound budgetary and fiscal m&jnagement basis. 5
5. U.S. 81st Congress 1st Session - Senate Report No. 366,
Calendar 356, National Security Act Ajnendments of 1949, p. 10.
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Two subjects, performance budgeting and industrial funds,
will be of continuing interest for the remainder of this paper.
For that reason both will be defined at this point to aid in the
presentation.
A performance budget is one in which all costs incidental
to the accomplishment of a specific Job are consolidated into an
identifiable project, with projects logically grouped into primary-
functions, and in which, insofar as possible, fiscal and manage-
ment responsibility are parallel. It separates current operating
expenses from capital expenditures. It is designed to focus at-
tention on the general character and relative importance of the
work to be done, or the service to be rendered, rather than the
equipment, supplies, and personal services required. Simply, it
is budgeting for things to be done rather than thin-'s to be bought,
Working Capital Funds are of two types, industrial or
commercial funds, and stock funds.
Industrial funds are devices for financing industrial type
activities whereby cash and inventories are invested as capital
for the operation of the activities on a basis comparable to pri-
vate business. These funds are authorized under section 405 of
Title IV, This authorizes the Secretary of Defense to provide
capital for industrial and stock funds for capitalizing the inven-
tories on hand and, with the approval of the President, by transfe^,
until December 31, 1954- from unexpended balances of any appropria-
tions of the military departments not carried to the surplus fund
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of the Treasury. Direct appropriations are also authorized, if
necessary, to provide capital.
A stock fund is a working capital fund established to
finance the acquisition and maintenance of materials, supplies
and equipment for sale within a military department or to other
military departments. It operates in a fashion similar to a pri-
vately owned merchandizing organization. The Bureau of Supplies
and Accounts has successfully operated a stock fund for over the
past thirty-five years. As a result, the Kavy had an advantage
over the other military services in adopting its organization to
the requirements of Title IV, because its inventory of the
thousands upon thousands of items accounted for under the naval
stock fund was clear, definite, positive and prompt, both as to
6
item and dollar value.
Implementation 19A9-1953 . -- The end of the fighting in Korea in
effect marked the termination of the first phase of implementing
Title IV provisions of the National Security Act of 194-9. During
the first four years, progress in implementing the various provi-
sions were far behind what Mr. Eberstadt and Mr. McNeil had hoped
and envisioned. This inertia was due to any number of reasons.
6. Testimony Mr. V.J. McNeil, Assistant Secretary of
Defense, Hearings Before the Preparedness Subcommittee No. 3 on
the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Eighty-
Third Congress First Session, Nov. 2, 1953, p. 127.
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As noted before, Title IV was relatively unnoticed by either Con-
7
gress or the public. In less than a year after the bill had been
approved, the Korean affair interfered with the orderly transition
Lastly, within the Military Establishment many vested interests
were not too anxious to vigorously implement this changeover,
especially when attention rightfully had to be focus sed on the
essential task of conducting the war.
In the meantime, budgetary planning and execution reverted
to a familiar pattern during times of crisis. During 1951, the
basic Navy appropriation of $4-, 076, 000, 000 mushroomed to
$12,252,000,000 with supplemental appropriations before the year
was ended. The second year a $14,761,000,000 appropriation was
not sufficient, requiring a supplemental of 1819,000,000, and an
urgent deficiency of an additional $39,000,000 to meet expenses.
However, in order to be fair, it is well to recall that the 1950
budget was vigorously protested by all our naval leaders. That in-
adequate budget had forced us to inactivate ships in 19-49 through
the spring of 1950. Several months later we were taking these
same ships out of mothballs for urgent use in the Pacific.
Despite all this, definite progress was made in implement-
ing some of the main provisions of Title IV, Comptroller organi-
zations had been established in most bureaus and offices, and in
many field activities including shipj/ards^ . field offices of the
7, Elias Huzar, The Purse and the Sword p. 177., (Ithica,
IJew York, Cornell University Press, 1952)
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Military Sea Transportation Service, the Naval Powder Factory,
some ordnance plants and in three naval districts. The Navy Comp-
troller had authority and responsibility in all financial matters.
Directives, policy statements, and instructions in the various
comptroller areas, such as disbursing, cost accounting, appro-
priation accounting were covered in volumes of the Navy Comptrolle
Manual, and were binding on the entire Naval Establishment.
In the second significant area, the Navy adopted the
Performance budget reducing the total number of appropriations
from 4-3 to 21. The performance budget focussed attention on pro-
grams, especially on: (l) Objectives to be attained, (2) cost,
and (3) accomplishment. This particular move to the Performance
budget has been controversial because the bases for primary class-
ification of appropriation titles were quite different between the
Navy on the one hand, and the Army and Air Force on the other.
The Navy moulded its structure around the existing organization
structure of its bureau system. This in effect brought appropria-
tion and management responsibility close together,
Mosher who believes that the Army and Air Force concept
more closely approaches the true performance budget has this to
say about the Navy's Budget:
Each bureau was given one or more appropriations
over which it has virtually exclusive jurisdiction
and which, together, are roughly coextensive with its
funetiong and responsibilities,*^ The fundamental basis,
therefore, is organizational rather than programmatic;
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the result is a classification that is fionctional in
the same degree that the organization of I^avy bureaus
is functional. But the actual organization of the
bureaus is ir.ore thf product of history anc? tradition
than of 8 lof?ical analysis and division of functions.
They could he described more accurately as units dis-
tinguished by subject matter and technical specialism,
than by function or pro.^ram. Tht second level of Navy
classification - the breakdown of appropriations into
budf^et activities - represents more of a functional
emphasis than does the first. As a result, many of
the same "activities" appear under different bureaus
and applicable to different subject matter. Many of
the appropriations inclade for example, the 'ictivities
of procurement, maintenance and operation, industrial
mobilization, r€ search and developrrent, and others. ^
Mosher' s reservations about the clasEificytion of naval
pro,«frams are pinpointed to tvro principal exceptionr in an Article
by Commancier Charles A. Slick:
The underlyinr philosophy of the perforF^ance bud,^jet
is to parallel management responsibility with fiscal
responsibility. Frceptlons to this general rule are
military personnel, and service wide operations. In
general, technical hureous are involved in the fiscal
affairs of only^those activities over vhich they have
fiscal control.^
The third major area of conversion during the period
between 1949 and 1953 was in shifting to the Navy Industrial Fund
at three shipyards, three ordnance plants, the Military Sea Trans-
portation Service, and various sinaller printing, research, and
clothing activities. In addition three more shipyards were in the
8. Mosher, op. cit . p. 85
9. Department of the I^avy, Bureau of Capplies und Ac-
counts, Commander Charles A. Blick, ''Performance Budget for the






process of conducting surveys before shifting over to the Naval
Industrial Fund in the early part of 1954-. Spectacular improve-
ments vere promptly achieved by the Military Sea Transportation
Service which were proudly acclaimed as typical of what to expect
as a result of the changeover.
At this time in the fall of 1953, two committees were
formed to evaluate and advise in the progress made in implement-
ing Title IV. The first committee was headed by Senator Flanders,
met in November, 1953. It reviewed the basic legislation for
soundness, and generally proded all three military services towaid
a more rapid implementation of the remaining provisions of Title
IV, It is significant to note that all officials interviewed,
from Secretary Wilson on down, agreed unanimously on the improved
management features of Title IV. The Navy had made far more pro-
gress than any other military service, and had the good fortune
to avoid the notoriety which attended the Arm-y's ammunition short-
age in Korea, and the Air Force's free issue of gasoline to
civilian air carriers.
The second committee was appointed by Secretary Wilson,
became known as the "Cooper Committee", after its chc:irmsn,
Charles P. Cooper, It organized into about sixteen or more work-
ing groups, each specializing in a specific problem area in the
field of military comptrollership. Inventories, Industrial Acti-
vities, Fiscal Training, and Fiscal Organisation and Procedures

are typical of the fields covered. The groups were made up of
eminent leaders in the business and academic vorld. The reports
of their surveys have been used extensively in extending the scope
of comptrollership throughout the Military Establishment.
Subsequent to 1953, the Navy accelerated its program to
Include all shipyards ^^nd the Repair Base, San Diego as Navy In-
dustrial Fund Activities. This represented a cash allocation of
$14,0,900,000, and an annual volume of business of $717,000,000.
Other ordnance activities were added, and at present a preliminary
survey is being conducted prior to installing it at the first




Budgeting for Facility Programs . — The purpose of this chapter
is to examine the procedures and techniques employed by field
activities and fleet activities of the Jjavy in budgetint^ for and
obtaining funds from the Bureau of Ships for the various facility
programs. The programs that will be covered, namely: (l) Plant
Equipment Program, (2) Major Non-recurring Maintenance Program,
and (3) Minor New Construction and Improvement Program, are fin-
anced from expenditures under the appropriation "Ships and
Facilities, Navy, Subhead 11.
«
The immense scope of the management control problem
confronting the Faeillties Division in the Bureau of Ships can be
partially understood by simply reading the lists of addressees
under its management control. It contains a total of one hundred
seventeen activities which Include eleven naval shipyards and nine
research laboratories. These activities are broken down into two
main categories; (l) those activities which are field units of the
Bureau of Chips, such as the shipyards, laboratories, repair facil
ities, and the repair departments of the many naval stations. All
these are field units, reporting directly for management, fiscal
and technical control; to the Bureau of £hips, (2) the fl^^et
activities, whose primary mission is to support the units of the




the Submarine Base, New London, Connecticut, Comnander Service
Force, United States Pacific Fleet, the Ship Repair Facility,
Yokosuka, Japan, and Naval Base, Subic Bay, Philippine Islands.
These activities report to the Bureau of Ships for management
and fiscal control via their fleet commanders. However, unlike
Ship overhaul funds which fleet commanders are delegated to con-
trol within their commands, shore facility money is administered
by the Bureau of Ships on the recommendations of the fleet com-
manders.
Procedure for Submitting Requests . — Each activity submits an-
nually a list of its requirements arranged in priority order,
within categories, complete with justifications. For the purpose
of classification, three categories are employed:
Category A - Items essential for current operations
Category B - Items desirable for current operations
Category C - Items required in event of mobilization
Items in Categories "A" and "B" will be approved for pro-
curement as accomplishment within availability of funds. Items in
these categories for which there are insufficient funds will be
used as estimates for future requirements; therefore each activity
will include in its annual submission, items desired to be funded
during the fiscal year beginning in July, and items to be used as




^'C* will be used for mobilization planning and estimating.
This is a fine objective, but unfortunately in recent
years, funds for other than routine and minimum maintenance have
been mighty difficult to obtain. There are literally thousands
of instances annually where requests for funds for recurring re-
pairs, major maintenance, and replacement of obsolete machinery
and equipment have been ignored year after year. For example,
in the New York Naval Shipyard, repairs to the overhead crane
tracks in one of the large shops was deferred for thirteen years
until this current yeer. The reason for authorizing accomplish-
ment this year was that it could no longer be safely deferred,
an opinion which Commanding Officer pointedly indicated in a
letter to the Bureau of Ships. Similarly, in both the New York
and Norfolk Shipyards, the building ways have not been painted,
or in any way preserved since 194-4" Unlike the crane tracks
these are not vital since they are not being utilized. However,
in event of mobilization, these will be but two of a long list
of urgent and vital items to be accomplished overnight at a cost
that undoubtedly will be staggering. In this respect it appears
that Comptrollers of the future will be hard put to avoid the
huge supplemental appropriations that may be forthcoming.
11. Manual for Administration of Facility Programs at
Field and Fleet Activities, NAVSHIPS 250-770, April 1956, p. 8.
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Pro.lect Orders and Allotments . — Funds are provided by means of
allotments or project orders. Allotments are generally straight-
forward and well understood, so no further elaboration is required
at this point. However, project orders have recently been the
subject of a close and critical inspection by auditors of the
General Accounting Office because of widesoread and continuous
abuse of this device.
The following are the purposes for which project orders
are issued:
(1) Manufacture, building, construction, fabrication, or
assembly of structures, equipment or other property,
(2) Research and development projects,
(3) Improvements to structures, equipment or other
property by modification, alteration, renovation, conversion, over*
haul or restoration.
(4) Major repairs to or replacements of stnictures,
equipment or other property.
Project orders will be issued for those projects which
can be started during the fiscal year and will be accomplished in
a substantial amount by station labor
Project orders may not be issued for the following:
(1) Routine, recurring maintenance and operation of
activities, equipment or grounds.
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(2) Education, training, subsistence, storage, welfare,
transportation or communications when any of these purposes is
1?.
the primary object.
The original intent of project order was to place Naval
industrial units in a better position to perform some of the com-
plicated tasks which required detailed planning and execution.
It was found desirable to give naval activities additional time to
complete these tasks over and above that needed for obligating al-
lotments. It is an excellent device for this purpose. However,
through the years, it has been frequently employed for obliterating
funds just before the June 30 deadline on allotments, at which
date unobligated funds would revert back to the Treasury.
Obviously this interferes with intent of Congress in ex-
ercising close control over appropriated funds, and commits large
funds that would normally revert to the Treasury. For this reason
the General Accounting Office is now conducting an extensive
audit of this area. As yet there is no indication of the final
decision, but undoubtedly Congress w^ill require much tighter con-
trol in the future. The Navy Comptroller has issued two in-
structions in the past year ordering all commands to take decisive
action to insure the validity of all obligations and expenditures
against project orders. Similar warnings were issued to prevent
overobligation and overexpenditure of allotments by the now famous
Section 1311. Commanding Officers are subject to suspension
12. Naval Comptrollers Manual, paragraphs 023400-0234-15.
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from duty without pay, or removal from office; and upon convictior,
a fine of not more than $5,000, and imprisonment for note more
13
than two years, or both. To date only adrainistative action has
been taken in cases of this nature, but the veiled threat is ap-
parent to even those who may be indifferent.
Plant Equipment Program . — There are many programs sponsored by
the various bureaus and offices of the Navy which help the aver-
age shore station carry out its missions. Primarily for the
purpose of familiarization with the procedures and special provi-
sions three of prime importance to Bureau of Ships activities
have been selected for inspection. These ere:
a. Plant Equipment Program
b. Major Non-Recurring Maintenance Program
c» Minor New Construction and Improvement Program
The first, the Plant Equipment Program, breaks down into three
categories v/hich are based primarily on the unit cost of an item,
and the total cost of a specific transaction. Xj> the first class
a Commanding Officer has authority to spend up to $10,000 in one
transaction providing the initial unit cost of the items procured
is less than $100. This is charged to the station's maintenance
and operation allotment, or to overhead, in the case of a Naval
Industrial Fund Activity. This simply means that if an activity
wanted to procure 100 typevrriters at $99 each, it would be entirely
13. Naval Comptrollers Manual, Volume 2, Appendix A.

21.
free to do so, providing the balance of the allotment is sufficient^.
In the next class, the initial unit cost is "between $100
and |1,000 while the total for the individual transaction remains
at $10,000. Again the activity is free to purchase if funds are
available. However, these requirements should be anticipated and
included in the integrated priority list of its needs that is sub-
mitted annually to the bureau prior to May for the next two fiscal
years. Detailed Ju.^tifications are not required unless the total
is in excess of normal requirements. In this case full explana-
tion should accompany the integrated priority list. Navy Indus-
trial Fund Activities have a facilities allotment established by
the Bureau for items costing between $500 and $1,000, These al-
lotments will also be used to clear APA material from stock to
plant use. Items costing less than |500 are termed "minor proper-
ty", and are charged to overhead.
In the third category are items whose initial cost exceeds
|1,000 or where the total specific transaction exceeds 110,000.
These requirements for the next two years are required with the
previously mentioned integrated priority list too. iss funds are
made available by the Bureau, letter notification is made with ac-
counting instructions. This either charges a local facilities al-
lotment set up for this purpose, or in event the Bureau procures
the material, it will be charged against Bureau funds.
Here is an area that is loaded with inconsistencies. If
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APA or "free issue*' materials are used, more likely than not, the
costs are not being included with other more tangible costs. In
addition, it occasionally happens that it is more advantageous for
a station to obtain APA equipment, cost free, than it would be to
repair equipment, where repairs and spare parts are charged
against an allotment. On the other hand, it is one means of tight
Bureau control over capital expenditures for equipment even though
costs cannot always be readily identified or consistently applied
Major Non~Hecurrin?. Maintenance ProKram . — Projects costing
under $10,000 will be charged to the local station Maintenance and
Operating Allotment, or to overhead in the Naval Industrial Fund
as applicable.
Projects costing over $10,000, will be shown on an inte-
grated priority list for anticipated projects for the next two
years. These will be complete with justifications, endorsed by
fleet comjuanders, and applicable Public Works Affairs, and will
reach the Bureau prior to May. These charges will be against the
local facilities allotment or project order established by the
Bureau. In Navy Industrial F'ljind activities if more than half the
cost of project is of a military support nature, funds will be
alloted against the Military Support Servic es allotment. On the
other hand, if more than half the cost is for maintenance of in-
dustrial facilities, the entire project will be funded under the
Naval Industrial Fund after Bureau's approval is obtained. This
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is another instance of unreasonable tif:ht Bureau control over its
decentralized industrial activities. In effect, although an ac-
tivity can effect and pay for its ovn repairs, approval is still
required.
Another significant point is the separate costs of a
military support nature -hich are covered "by a separate allotment.
This includes military rtayt maintenance of quarters, and costs of
a non-industrial nature within the command. The unused building
vays previously discussed are also considered in this category
since they have not been used since World Var II. In fiscal year
1956, Military Support Services at the eleven shipyards totalled
$21,000,000, or one-third of the combined Maintenance and Opera-
tions Allotment for the fleet and shore activities oth^.r than
shipyards. If the Navy Industrial I'und is to become meaningful,
it would appear that this is one item that should be costed into
the fund, rather than handled by a separate allotment.
Minor New Construction and Improvement PrQp:ram . — In the field
of Public Works, there is little doubt that Congress definitely
controls the purse strings. The Commanding Officer of an acti-
vity is limited to |5,000 for construction and approval projects.
While approval is not required, each project, for the coming two
years, will be shown on the annual integrated priority list.
Projects costing between |5,000 and |25,000 must be sub-
mitted for approval by the Bureau of Ships, Likewise these pro-
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Jects will be shown on the integrated priority list, and justified
for at least two successive years. Emergent projects, which are
determined by the Secretary of the Navy or the Secretary of De-
fense to be urgently required, may be approved by the Secretary
of the Navy for amounts up to $200,000.
Public Works is an area which is bound to be restricted
for obvious political considerations which are vitaHyimportant to
Congress. However, the waste, inefficiency and unnecessary ex-
travagance while constructing air bases in North Africa about 1951
contributed much in bringing about these restrictive measures.
It is interesting to note a comparison between the lati-
tude in constructing and repair projects allowed top management
in the Navy with the DuPont and General Electric Corporations.
While the Chief of the Bureau of Ships is allowed $?5,000, Du Pont
and General Electric Division Managers are allowed $100,000 and
15.
$500,000 respectively for construction projects.
Consideration . — Vhile many improvements are apparent, one basic
step, it would appear, would vastly simplify, shorten, and producer
more meaningful budgets. Simply delegate to the three fleet com-
manders, the task of apportioning funds for activities under th^ir
14. Notes from Lecture by Mr. W, J. McNeil, Assistant
Secretary of Defense, to Navy Comptrollership Class.
15. Notes from Lectures by Mr. A. L. French, Assistant




control. Coinmunicetions and technical assistance from the bureaus
would be maintained, but the load would be considerably reduced
at each level. This system is used for ship overhauls and has
proven very effective, especially from the ship*s point of view.




OPERATION OF THE NAVAL INDUSTRIAL FUND
General
.
^^ ^^955 Mr. Franke, Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Comptroliership) said, "It F^ust be kept constantly in mind that
the installation of the Navy Industrial Fund at industrial and
commercial type activities is no guarantee of their successful
operation". He may -well have had the results of the submarine
conversion program between 1952 and 1955 in mind. Dviring this
period submarines were being converted from their conventional
World War II designs to their high speed, snorkel, streamlined
appearance of today. This program was being carried out at the
Mare Island, Charleston, and Portsmouth Naval Shipyards, and at
the Electric Boat Company, a division of the General Dynamics
Corporation, the leading builder of submarines in the United
States.
The cost figures produced from the records showed that
Mare Island, which at that time was under the appropriation system
of accounting, expended 75,000 man days in accomplishing the task.
Well behind Mare Island was the Electric Boat Company with 105,000
man days and Charleston, a Navy Industrial Fund Shipyard, with
120,000 man days. Portsmouth, under the appropriation system of
accounting, had undisputed claim on last place. On the basis of
this fine performance by Mare Island, verified by fiscal and engi-
neering inspection groups from the Electric Boat Company, the con-
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tract held by Electric Boat was renegotiated downward.
This illustrates the point Mr. Franke had in raind, that
while the double entry accrual system of accounting, utilized by
private industry end the Naval Industrial Fund activities, is an
effective aid to management, it does not automatically place the
activity on a plane with Lincoln Electric Company for efficiency
in operations.
However, in 1953, after evaluating the progress made by
shipyards under the industrial fund. Secretary Anderson revealed
that the Navy fully intended to accelerate its program of convert-
16
ing shipyards to the new system. p^^ ^hat early date, when only
three shipyards had been converted for less than a maximum period
of eighteen months, it was already readily apparent that the Navy
Industrial Ftmd was far superior to the appropriation system of ac-
counting in this field. This testimony came principally from the
Shipyard Commanders who had vigorously opposed the change initially
To-day, two and a half years later, with all shipyards converted,
opinion is still the same, but there is also recognition of the
fact that there are important areas for refinement. This is not
only the opinion of those in the Shipyards and in the Bureau of
Ships, but also members of the Cooper Committee Working Group that
Bade a survey of Kaval shipyards, Army and Navy Ordnance arsenals,
16. Hearings Before i>ub-Committee iio. 3 of the Committee




Air Force, Army and Kavy aircraft engine and motor vehicle main-
tenance and overhaul facilities in 1954, Listed below are the
major advantageous apparent from the use of the Navy Industrial
Fund.
Cost Consciousness . — Probably the most significant change is the
increased cost consciousness of all levels of management. This is
particularly true at the Charleston Kaval ijhipyard where standard
costs have been installed. However, in 1950, the Navy adopted a
long range policy of diverting a large portion ship building and
ship repair funds to private shipyards. This also contributed
significantly to cost consciousness. Boring fiscal year 1956 ap-
proximately 1600,000,000 is being expended for this pui'pose, even
though the Navy*s shipyards are operating well below capacity.
This policy of maintaining a trained oivllian reserve in a de-
clining Industry, has driven home a sense of economy in a realis-
tic way. All levels of management and employees realize that
people, space, equipment and services must be utilized effective-
ly, and more important, the Navy Industrial Fund is an excellent
tool for this purpose.
Product Costs . — Secondly, it emphasises end product costs in
all transactions. With competition, accurate estimates are a
necessity. If, for example, estimates are poor, this will be
directly reflected in the financial position of the shipyard.
Thus there is an acute awareness of the necessity for realistic
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©osting of items proauced which the Naval Industrial Fund proviea.
In the same general area, it pinpoints ineffioienoies in a
^problem area promptly and factually. Praotically every shipyard
has a Tabulating .Section within the Comptroller's Department which
provides frequent statements on controllable expenses and product-
ivity that are timely and effective tools of management control.
Other advantages that can be mentioned are:
(1) Cost data produced will produce more accurate budgets.
(2) Provides greater flexibility.
(2) Provides a customer-supplier relationahip.
(4) Provides a business type approach to industrial
operations.
(5) Provides simplified financing in a single no-year
revolving fund.
disadvantages and Inconsistencies. — In late 1953, as mentioned
previously, two independent groups evaluated and took inventory of
the four years spent in implementing Title IV. The first committee
under Senator Flanders, examined the extent of implementation while
generally accepting the basic structure as sound. The aecond
group under Charles P. Cooper, attacked the problem of analyzing
the business structure of the Department of Defense in much the
same manner as xhe Hoover Commission had done for all government
agencies previously. It was a thorough analytic appraisal, by
capable working groups, at the request of iDeoretary of Defense
Wilson. Many of the recommendations made have already been im-
plemented. Others have been viewed as incompatible with desired

objeotives. However, one thing is certain, it was a healthy ap-
praisal, and served as a sound basis for further development.
Some of these defioienoies are included in the following liat, but
all represent the views of so called "Middle Management" at
Bureau and field level.
Excluded Costs. — Under Havy Industrial Fund accounting "Costs"
have become an item of consequence. However, in some respects
these costs are really not a significant item of management data
because of loose estimates and excluded costs which should be in-
eluded in figuring the cost of the product. The following are a
list of the principal "excluded costs":
(1) Free Issue materials, which are bureau controlled,
and which have been purchased, paid for, and charged to some ap-
propriation in the past. These could very easily be picked up in
the stock fund, and then charged to the appropriation ultimately
using then. Uiider the present system their use permits no sound
basis for comparisons.
(2) Military Pay and Allowances are not charged tOi the
costs of the products. As pointed out previously, the pay of all
persons directly or indirectly associated with the product should
be computed into the cost of that product.
(3) The cost of depreciation should be included as an in-
dustrial cost. The Bureau of iships uses the straight line method
of depreciation in its property and plant accounts, but these fi-
gures are not included in the costs of the product. The principal
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reason for this is the desire for Congressional control.
Congressmen were quick to realisse that their oontrol over
industrial activities would decrease appreciably if fixed assets
wtre capitalized, and replaced without consulting them. For this
reason there is little hope for improvement in this particular
axea. In passing, it should he noted that other assets in the
Havy, such as ships, aircraft, and combat vehicles should not be
included in depreciation accounting for the simple reason that they
represent combat material.
(4) ^he final element of "excluded costs" is employee
jfringe benefits for civilian workers. This represents roughly SjS
of wages paid, and are handled by other governmental units. They
do not reach the books of the Bureau of uhips at ©11.
lfe.intenanoe Costs. — Costs related to this subject are not
spread over the estimated span between repairs, but are accrued
within the fiscal year in which the work is accomplished. This
violates the baei^ accounting principal of recognizing costs in thi
period which they occur. More important, it is basically unfair te
units of the fleet undergoing overhaul during periods of excessive
maintenance projects. Through the media of overhead, they assume
an unfair burden of maintenance costs. However, in order to cor-
rect this situation, additional capitalisation will be required.
Since the prospects of getting it from Congress are remote, it may





Appropriation Aooounting Burden . — One of the original ideas that
led to the Navy Industrial Fund was the many instances of poor
management control in using the Appropriation System of Account-
ing. As practiced now, the Havy Industrial Fund does not supplant
the appropriation system of accounting, but is merely superimpose!
on top of it. This vastly increases the administrative burden re-
quiring shipyards to report status on allotments for the many
areas they are issued. Previously mentioned are allotments intiw
fields of Minor Kew Construction and Military Support. These
reports, as it is well known, are very rigid as to date of sub-
mission, which in turn causes diversion from the principal task
of serving the more immediate needs of the Shipyard Commander*
This briefly covers the major advantages and shortcomings
of the Havy Industrial Fund. Not all the improvements noted are
entirely the result of operations under the Navy Industrial Fund,
but unlike the previous system of appropriation accounting, the
Fund created the elimate and showed the direction. It is with
this in mind, that the last and least noticeable contribution is
mentioned. It created a sound basis for future development*
17. Report of the Industrial itotivities forking Group,
Prepared for advisory Committee on Fiscal Organization and Pro-
ceGures, Office of the secretary of Defense, Viashin^ton, D.C.
July 1954, p. 3£.

CMAPTE& IT
DEVSLOPMEMTS IH APPHOPRIiVI lOH ACOOmrCIKG SYSTEM
(General . — If any one report were to be aoleotea. as having set
the objeotives for the development of a more effective appropria-
tion aoooanting system, the logical choice would be the Task Force
Report (Appendix F) of the Hoover Comaiseion. This report, pre-
pared in 1948, has set not only the objectives to be achieved, but
also the general pattern necessary for the orderly evolutionary
change in the appropriation structure* Implementation of all the
features recommended would be nothing less than a miracle.
Adoptions of some features are unrealistic in that they fail to
recognise the rights and privileges of Congress. Still others
would prove impractical in that they would be expensive and not
aotoally necessary in the numerous ssiall stations.
With these ideas in mind, this rather lengthy excerpt on
18
the advantages of accrual accounting is presented:
BASIS OF ACCOUMIIKG. - Next in importance to the
establishment of an appropriate accounting system
and the responsibility therefor is determination of
the basis upon which the Government's acoounts shall
be kept*
There are two bases of accounting. One is the
eas^ basis, the other the accrual basis, qthe cash
basis amounts to little more than the recording of
receipts and disbursements, when used in the keeping
of governmental books, the cash basis produces little
more than an account of revenues collected and money
paid out.
Under the accrual basis, income is taken into
account when it is earned, and expenditures are taken
h^.c.J"^'!^^ ^2^f? iieport {App. F) Prepared for the Commission on
I9ft^^« ?n^°f ^m® Executive Branch of the Government. January,




into ecoount when they are made. Thus, to state it
simply, when the acorual basis is used in governmental
accounting, revenues are taken into account and put
under control when they are assessed for formally
established, controls of expendable supplies, and the
investment therein are maintained, and expenses are
taken into account as they are incurred. On the
budgetary side, the accrual basis affords full current
information concerning the realiasation of the revenue
estimates and the expenditure and availability of ap-
propriations.
In government, control of appropriations is especially
impor'bant. In order to control the use Lnd prevent over-
expenditure of appropriations, it is necessary that the
available balance of each account be known at all times.
The available balance of an appropriation is the dif-
ference between the amount appropriated and the sum of
the amounts already withdrawn and the amounts that will
be withdrawn from it in settlement of expenditures that
have not yet reached the disbursement stage*
Thus, in budgetary accounting, expenaiture ooeurs when
a commitment to buy is made, and it is imperative that
appropriation accounts be charged at this time*
If something purohased is not immediately consumed,
further accounting becomes necessary. To illustrate,
If a commitment is made to purchase supplies that may
last for considerable time, expense is not incurred at
the time the supplies are received, but later, as they
are consumed.
Thus, accounting for expenditures of appropriations
is one thing, and accounting for incurrence of expenses
is another. But, both are necessary, the former to
control the consumption of appropriations, the latter
to control, among other things, the evil of year end
rushing to spend surplus balances of appropriations and
the investment in supply inventories as well.
Refinements of accounting such as have been explained
are not afforded by the cash basis of accounting. The
Government's accounting is a mixture of the cash basis
and the acorual basis, but it does not include supply
accounting.
We think it obvious that a basis of accounting that
never shows the Government s x ^4AVVOA Biiwwa MiA« wuvoixiiaottu o
^p^Q revenues and expenses
for any year, and that does not provide proitive control
of assets, liabilities, and appropriations is thoroughly
inappropriate for the Government's needs. We suggest,
therefore, that the cash basis of accounting be completely
ruled out, and that the accrual basis be adopted for all
of the Government's accounting*
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In progresaing toward this ol)jeotive, the Havy has taken
two signifleant etepo. The Nayy Industrial Fund isith the double-
intpy accounting maintained on an accrual "basis has t)een adopted,
Eis we well know, for the large industrial units. In the second
area, it has streamlined its appropriation system by going to the
Program Budget, while reducing the total numher of appropriations
froa 48 to 21, as preriously noted. This gives the Bureau of
Ships an allocation of three appropriations:
(1) Ships and Facilities, Navy
(2) Construction of Ships, Navy
(3) Shipbuilding and Convepsion, Havy.
The Cooper Committee in their report recommended re-
ductions in the number of appropriations to five for each Service.
19
These categories of expenditures are:
(1) Military Personnel
{Z) Maintenance and Operations
(3) Procurement and Production
(4) Research and Development
(5) Construction
This would not radically upset the existing budgetary
structure for field and fleet activities under the Bureau of
Ships management control. The "Facilities" appropriation would
19. Financial Management in the Department of Defense,
Advisory Committee on Fiscal Organizatioxi and Procedures, Office
of the Secretary of Sefense, Washington, D.C, October 1954, p. 11,

\)9 disooutluaed, ana in its pleioo, "Malntenanoe and Operations"
woald \)9 the annual appropriation for items required for xoaintea-
ance and operations. The other category of expenditure, "Prooure-
ment and Production," a no-year appropriation, would ooTor long
lead time items such as Plant Equipment and Construction. Note
that this plan does not pattern itself to individual bureau con-
trol of appropriations, which, in effect, would pass financial
control one leyel higher. Without speculating-, it is not diffi-
cult to visualize the increasingly important role the Havy Comp-
troller may play in the future whether or not these recommenda-
tions are implemented.
One point, however, appears clear. The direction of
change is definitely in the direction recommended by the Hoover
Committee, towards a sound accounting structure employing the ac-
crual basis. This coupled with an improved budgetary structure,
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